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Abstract. Th is inquiry outlines Karl Bühler’s three kinds of deixis, focusing partic-
ularly on his most advanced use – deixis am phantasma (deictics to refer to absent 
referents). Th is use is of primary import to the semiosis of index, given the central-
ity of the object and the interpretant in changing the function of the indexical sign 
in ontogeny. Employing deictic signs to refer to absent objects (some of which are 
mental) constitutes a catalyst from more social, conventional, uses to more inter-
nal, imaginative, ones.  Bühler’s analogy of mental objects as a “mimesis” serves as 
the genesis for the claim that static and more dynamic memories, fuelled by aff ect, 
drive deictics to refer to more dynamic objects and more dynamic interpretants, 
into more constructed realities. Peirce’s two types of objects and three types of in-
terpretants complete Bühler’s deictic framework; they determine advances in deic-
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1. Introduction
Karl Bühler’s concept of index as expressed in his developmental framework of de-
ixis: demonstratio ad oculos, anaphoric deixis, and deixis am phantasma is sorely un-
derdiscovered; and theories of index,1 and of deictics2 in particular, remain relative-
ly uninformed with respect to how apprehension of shift ing points of view is para-
mount to a theory of mind and to a worldview which incorporates human compo-
nents of discovering and extending knowledge. It is particularly invaluable to inqui-
ry in semiotics, in that it constructs an integrated viewpoint within which aff ect and 
logic systematically inform one another. His unitary, holistic approach underscores 
the artifi ciality of constructing a worldview based on logic or cognition alone, un-
impelled by emotional sources, such as empathy, self-regulation, feelings of ac-
countability, hidden inhibitions, and self-affi  rmation within a sociocultural milieu. 
Integral to Bühler’s semiotic is the assumption that fantasy and “reality” are indistin-
guishable. In fact, he insists that fantasy is a primary tool toward situating the self in 
a more conventional reality, and of infusing reality with new possibilities. Fantasy, 
for Bühler, is a necessary component to determine postures of mind for others, and 
for Self. Th e centrality of fantasy and the imagination in his deictic framework dem-
onstrates the importance of aff ective and constructed realities to the perception and 
function of self in a sea of legitimate selves.  Th e place which Bühler gives to aff ect 
in his deictic framework emphasizes that perspective-taking skills do not result pri-
marily from cognitive att ainments, but from overt and covert verbal play in which 
children experiment with viewpoints and decide which are legitimate to adopt. 
Th ese overt or covert dialogues with the Self materialize in monologues, in dialogue 
between inanimates, e.g., dolls, or in child-to-child play scenarios. Within these fan-
tasy-based scenarios, children construct their worldview as they determine both the 
legitimacy of two or more confl icting viewpoints, and the authenticity of each in a 
spatial and temporal framework beyond that of play or fantasy.  
Aff ect, then, transforms real-time cognitions into potentialities in constructed 
fantasy. Impelled by emotional intelligence, deictic use evolves from a purely single 
viewpoint to static objects, to one which embraces other points of view from diff er-
ent orientations with respect to objects whose placement can be altered, to view-
points which have not yet materialized. Bühler’s developmental scheme of dem-
onstratio ad oculos, to anaphoric reference, to deixis am phantasma demonstrates 
1 “Index” will be used in the Peircean sense of that which “[...] represents an object by virtue of 
its connection with it.  It makes no diff erence whether the connection is natural, or artifi cial, or 
merely mental” (CP 8.368 fn23). 
2   A distinction is presumed here between index and deictics.  Only some indexes are used 
deictically – “In addition to indexical qualities, deictics must include a general/symbolic 
meaning which considers the social and reciprocal role of the referent.” (West 2011b: 90)
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increased use of fantasy and the imagination as catalysts to the development of 
index, in that he proposes three levels of pointing. His three levels of pointing il-
lustrate a trajectory of indexical development from the more pure index in which 
object and deictic sign co-occur,3 to a mental index in which the deictic sign and 
object are displaced from one another.4 Although Bühler’s deictic system serves as 
a useful foundation to explain such displacement, it leaves unsett led applications of 
deictics in contexts in which the sign and the object are intangible.  Peirce’s contri-
bution of triadic sign relations – sign, object, interpretant – addresses this “unfi n-
ished business”.
2. Precursors to deixis am phantasma
Bühler’s (1990[1934]: 44) insights with respect to deictic use are fi rst found in 
the linkage between the Greek meaning of  “deixis/δεῖξις” (“pointing out”) and its 
Latin translation: “demonstratio”. Th e marriage of “pointing out” and “demonstra-
tio” enriches our understanding of deixis in that demonstrations involve more than 
physical gestures to physically present referents. Demonstrations transcend spatial 
and temporal contiguity between the signifi er and the signifi ed (between a point-
ing fi nger and its object of focus); they refer to absent physical objects and to mem-
ories brought about by mental operations. Mental operations themselves can dem-
onstrate, especially to their subject, the existence or non-existence of a proposition, 
or can construct mental representations of diverse points of view. In reminding us 
of the import of demonstration to deictic use, Bühler provides a forum to describe 
children’s later development – of their means to go beyond physical and intertex-
tual contexts in space and time to indexes on the mental plane, which most oft en 
are displaced from the originating contributory event.
Bühler proposes three types of deixis, categorized by their use, whose advent 
appears to be sequential in ontogeny: demonstratio ad oculos, anaphoric deixis, and 
deixis am phantasma. Although all of these three types of deixis are employed later 
in development, the onset of each emanates from distinctive sources or motiva-
tions. Bühler’s sequence of deictic use capitalizes on increasing degrees of social 
and psychological awareness, which may well rest upon unconscious intersubjec-
tive advances. Intersubjective here refers to the sociocognitive competence of 
3  Th is claim is supported by Peirce’s explanation that: “Psychologically, the action of indices 
depends upon association by contiguity, and not upon association by resemblance or upon 
intellectual operations” (CP 2.306).
4  Peirce refers to another function of index, that of conveying information despite whether 
any physical contiguity is present between sign and object: “Th en the question arises is this 
dual character in the Index, so that it has two elements […] Its connection with the weather is 
dualistic, so that by an involved icon, it actually conveys information” (CP 5.75).
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anticipating, envisioning, and constructing expressions of reciprocal social, and 
later intrasubjective role-taking.  
Demonstratio ad oculos is the earliest use of deixis which employs either gestural 
indices, or linguistic ones (separately or conjoined). Gestural signs which illustrate 
this use are dependent on visual access both to the sign and to its object from a 
Bühlerian perspective. Th e demonstrative is used to directionalize from Ego’s per-
spective; its use does not extend to other, more static, origos whose orientations 
shift  reciprocally or otherwise. Although Bühler does not explicitly include the 
earliest demonstrative uses in demonstratio ad oculos, he implies that early uses of 
demonstrative are equally dependent on access (visual and auditory) to the sign 
and the object of focus. Although Bühler does not set forth an explicit defi nition 
of demonstratio ad oculos within his works translated into English, in contrasting it 
with the other two deictic uses, he leaves us in no doubt that it relies exclusively 
on the perceptual, using limited visual devices: “Instead of the fi nger gesture, other 
optical or acoustic cues can be used [in demonstratio ad oculos], and instead of all of 
them together, situational indices or conventional aids of interpretation can enter 
in.  But of what has been listed here, nothing can be omitt ed […] any deictic word 
without such guidelines is running blind to its meaning” (Bühler, 1982[1934]: 
18).  According to Bühler, if these indexes are separated from their objects within 
the physical or temporal context, they are not interpretable, or are subject to misin-
terpretation. Eventually, deictics become less dependent on the perceptual context 
and consist of more varied devices in language and in memory to point out. Deictic 
development proceeds from “[…] less diff erentiated [demonstratio ad oculos] to 
richer inventories of form [the other two deictic uses]” (Bühler, 1982[1934]: 17); 
it appears that the form of the index can be more varied, making less critical the 
physical connection (spatial contiguity) in space and time between index and its 
object.  In other words, even when deictic words serve as indexes to orientations 
and places which are actualized at the time of utt erance, they are still forms of 
Bühler’s initial use of deixis (demonstratio ad oculos). 
Th is is so, since the index “this” or “here” could be misinterpreted apart from its 
co-occurrence in the physical context. On the other hand, when used in the same 
spatial and temporal context with their objects, ambiguity is not an issue. Bühler 
claims that the same orientation between speaker and another disambiguates deic-
tic meaning without addressing how likely this sameness is apart from being in the 
same place and time. Th e assumption that Bühler’s sameness of orientation trans-
lates likewise into sameness of place is a reasonable one, in that monitoring another 
person’s location and orientation with respect to the speaker would hardly have 
been likely without current technological devices: “Th e words ‘straight ahead’ and 
‘right’ in my discourse are unambiguous only by virtue of the fact that the stranger’s 
nose already points in the direction in which he needs to go” (Bühler, 1982[1934]: 
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19). Hence, both gestures and early demonstrative use are quintessential examples 
of demonstratio ad oculos.  In fact, Bühler uses demonstratives to illustrate demon-
stratio ad oculos:  “What is decisive is the knowledge that only the naming words 
characterize their object as a something, distinct from something else, according 
to the determinateness of what kind of thing it is, whereas according to Apollonius 
the pronouns [demonstratives] make do with a deixis to that something which they 
att empt to capture” (Bühler 1990[1934]: 135). Th ese early demonstrative uses are 
more like pointing gestures, and are unlike anaphoric intertextual uses, in that they 
are not terms which refer intertextually to other terms, nor are they nouns which 
intrinsically classify. Th ey are restricted to Ego’s point of reference, and to Ego’s ca-
pricious notice of a present object.  
A later skill, still characterizing demonstratio ad oculos, is the means to assume 
the point of view of another person present to Ego. Th is is still demonstratio ad ocu-
los, because despite its advancement in recognizing social role-taking of diff erent 
viewpoints, those viewpoints must be present, perceptually apparent. Th e person’s 
orientation (while present to subject) either matches or is distinctive from that of 
Ego (i.e., facing in the same direction, or facing speaker, respectively). Th is recogni-
tion of diff erent orientations enhances, and in turn is facilitated by, the contrastive 
use of demonstratives referring to near and far space (Tanz 2009[1980]: 87, 125; 
West 2010: 18, 2011a: 671). Although Bühler’s schema of demonstratio ad oculos 
encompasses some recognition of social role-taking and orientational shift s, it re-
stricts them to Ego’s experience, i.e., cognizance that self can assume listener role 
and can move about in space to assume diff erent spatial relationships to the same 
objects. All of these skills and deictics which are incumbent to them depend upon 
Ego’s direct perception of individual experience. “Seeing” from the reverse per-
spective, if it is in direct opposition to what Ego sees, constitutes a more advanced 
skill not aff orded by direct experience. Findings from Tanz (2009[1980]: 87, 125) 
demonstrate that children do not consistently employ demonstratives to refer to an 
opposing point of view from that of Ego, even when both perspectives are mutually 
present, until nearly fi ve years of age – hence, this skill exceeds the competencies 
prevailed upon in demonstratio ad oculos. Provided that Ego’s perspective and that 
of another match, the perceptual experience can defi ne the other’s point of view. 
Demonstratio ad oculos characterizes limited aspects of a more social use, given reli-
ance on perceptual cues in the here and now – the opposing point of view must be 
observable and non-opposing, such that Ego can see the orientation and share it 
with respect to the objects and direction of eye gaze.5 Litt le, if any, departure from 
spatial and temporal contiguity between the signifi er and the signifi ed is apparent 
5   As cited above: “Th e words ‘straight ahead’ and ‘right’ in my discourse are unambiguous 
only by virtue of the fact that the stranger’s nose already points in the direction in which he needs 
to go” (Bühler 1982[1934]: 19).  
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in this use. In other words, demonstratio ad oculos characterizes those representa-
tions (word or gesture) which are bound to the perceptual or situational context.
Bühler’s anaphoric deixis exists solely on the linguistic plane – both the signi-
fi er and its intertextual signifi ed are present within the discourse. Th e likelihood of 
ambiguity increases with amount of intervening text and with diverse third-person 
referents. Although the former depends on memory and pragmatic cues to connect 
deictic to antecedent, the latt er depends on syntactic relationships between ante-
cedents and the respective anaphoric deictic (Lust et al. 1996: 62). Unlike demon-
stratio ad oculos, anaphoric deixis does not rely on Ego’s simultaneous observation 
of the sign and its object; instead, both the anaphoric deictic and its antecedent ob-
ject exist in the same dialogue or text, independent of any sensory access. While 
temporal contiguity between anaphor and antecedent is relatively undisturbed, 
spatial contiguity is not a necessary component for successful interpretation. In 
fact, as Lust (1986: 13–14) points out, the anaphor does not constitute a specif-
ic, but refers to another referent in the discourse. Th e textual reference must be in 
relative temporal proximity within a topic frame (which can translate into spatial 
contiguity in writt en texts). In other words, Bühler’s anaphoric deixis consists of a 
linguistic intratextual referent, but not a referent assumed to be within the knowl-
edge base and focus of both participants within a dialogue. He focuses on the for-
mer type when illustrating what constitutes anaphoric deixis: 
From a psychological viewpoint, any anaphoric use of deictic words presup-
poses that both sender and receiver have access to the fl ow of discourse as a 
whole, where parts may be re-taken up and anticipated.  Th is whole must be 
accessible to sender and receiver, so that a wandering is possible, comparable 
to the passing of one’s gaze over an optically present object. (Bühler 1982 
[1934]: 21, italics original)
Th e “wandering” to which Bühler refers covers the linguistic context of discourse, 
and not previously shared experiences, which culminate in shared memory and fo-
cus, since later in the same paragraph (Bühler 1982[1934]: 21) characterizes the 
“wanderings” as “immediate memory” or “immediate retention”.  Bühler’s use of 
“immediate” indicates a reliance on the surrounding text for anaphoric deixis, as 
opposed to more temporally remote memories of past shared events. A reliance on 
the latt er, more remote, memory base appears to fi t into Bühler’s more develop-
mentally advanced mode of pointing: deixis am phantasma. Like demonstratio ad 
oculos, there still exists a certain sense of immediacy in establishing contiguity be-
tween anaphoric deictic and its referent – reliance on linguistic context.
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3. Characteristics of deixis am phantasma:
 Bühler’s third category (deixis am phantasma) entails the use of a gesture or a word 
to refer to a tangible object which is displaced from the time and place of the refer-
ring act, e.g., pointing to an object which may be associated with a place or time, 
but which is absent, or has not materialized at that particular time.6  Bühler admits 
that the displacement between deictic and object is more att enuated in deixis am 
phantasma than in anaphoric deixis; since in the former, the deictic is decontextu-
alized from its object, while in the latt er, both the anaphor and its antecedent are 
textually present (especially in writt en texts, given the easy means to review). Aft er 
observing some abilities in the domain of immediate retention, Bühler asserts, 
“[…] similar abilities in the domain of no longer immediate but mediate retention, 
that is in the domain of grown-up memories and of the constructive imagination 
[…] Let us call this third mode of pointing deixis am phantasma” (Bühler 1982 
[1934]: 21, italics original). Th is reference to “mediate retention” indicates a great-
er dependence on memory to associate the deictic device to its object.  Deixis am 
phantasma, then, elevates the function of the deictic to a higher mental plane, since 
the object of the deictic is beyond observation. Th e deictic refers not to an object 
in the here and now, nor to an antecedent in the now, but to a mental image or 
memory of the object, which Bühler claims can originate in subjective perceptions, 
and culminate in constructed dreams: “Psychologically speaking, a dreamland is 
to be found in the Somewhere, with which a linkage to the Here cannot be given” 
(Bühler, 1982[1934]: 29). Th e memories or dreams which emerge can be con-
structed and/or called up while using the conventional deictic to create subjective 
envisionings or fantasies, especially while awake:  “It is not the case at all that the 
natural deictic aids, upon which the demonstratio ad oculos is based, are completely 
missing in deixis am phantasma” (Bühler 1982[1934]: 23); and, “He who is led by 
phantasma cannot follow the arrow of the speaker’s outstretched arm and point-
ed fi nger with his gaze to fi nd the something out there […]” (Bühler 1982[1934]: 
23). Th ese deictic forms can be gestural (pointing, eye gaze) or linguistic (primar-
ily demonstrative and locative use). To illustrate the use of deictic signs in this ca-
pacity, Bühler cites pointing as the primary device: “We deal here only with situ-
ation-phantasmas, with the aid of which ‘pointing’ is done” (Bühler 1982[1934]: 
27). By “situation-phantasmas” Bühler appears to refer to memories which would 
not materialize but for a physical cue or stimulus in the immediate sett ing; and the 
implication is that occurrences of deixis am phantasma are a direct consequence of 
6  Harris and Richert’s (2008: 541) claim that talking about an entity can essentially bring it 
into existence further underscores the pivotal role of language in referring to novel, absent, or 
imagined places and objects.  
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retrospective memories of observed events (independent of the subject’s degree 
of participation). Th e memories, or retentions, which constitute “situation-phan-
tasmas” have their origin in recognition of a stimulus within the immediate spatio-
temporal context, especially that of the previous location of an object or event. In 
fact, deictic devices are direct consequences of these “situation-phantasmas”.   
Bühler’s use of “eidetic memory” (vivid visual images of previous experiences) 
demonstrates the intensity, or emotive force, of the memory to bring about an in-
stance of deixis am phantasma – pointing to “nothing”. Th is integral causal connec-
tion between mental visual sign and deictic device makes prominent Bühler’s tacit 
assertion that subjective visual images drive deictic demonstrations both in demon-
stratio ad oculos and deixis am phantasma. Th e former makes use of visual access to 
present objects, while the latt er relies upon vivid visual memories of absent objects 
or events. While the nexus between demonstratio ad oculos and deixis am phantasma 
is evident in Bühler’s writings, the transition from one to the other and how deixis 
am phantasma develops from retrospective memories to prospective, constructed 
ones, are less clear. Consequently, some liberty in extrapolating from Bühler’s ac-
count is in order.    
Distinctive sources for the memories which give rise to uses of deixis am phan-
tasma are implicit in Bühler’s assertions on the topic: Retrospective vs. Prospective 
events. “Situation-phantasmas” (Bühler 1982[1934]: 27) arise more oft en at the 
outset of the use of deictics to refer to mentally represented events; and surface 
earlier ontogenetically in the phantasmas less dependent on contextual cues. To 
reiterate, “situation-phantasmas” typically emerge upon sensory notice of an asso-
ciated place, or other stimulus within that place or time, as in the case of a mem-
ory triggered consequent to direct visual notice of a location of a prior poignant 
event with all of its contextual features (other intracontextual objects and linguistic 
stimuli). Th e memory source which gives rise to these phantasmas is retrospective, 
since perceptual copies of actual events constitute the nature of the phantasma or 
memory. Th ese memories are situational in that though they are subject to idiosyn-
cratic perception, they represent a relatively static and iconic “picture” of events as 
observed. One’s own experience is the basis for the subsequent mental image.  Th is 
retrospective orientation is the foundation for providing orientationally-based in-
structions to others, a skill to which Bühler refers rather frequently: “[…] the one 
who is leading, and the one who is being led, must have a suffi  cient degree of har-
monious orientation; orientation within an order schema in which the reference 
object has its place” (Bühler 1982[1934]: 22). When providing instructions, Ego 
must draw upon personal past experience (static) to off er coherent instructions 
to another in that same place. Ego must have already visited that place and must 
have noticed his or her location with respect to other contextually present objects. 
Although some subjectivity is responsible for the initial perception of the event 
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and its reconstruction during recall, subjectivity is at a minimum when compared 
to processes intrinsic to more developmentally advanced phantasmas, in which 
perspective-taking skills are central.7 
 Other retrospective phantasmas, which are accompanied by deictic indicators, 
oft en come unbidden to one’s consciousness; and despite the suddenness of the 
memories’ onset, the phantasmas are likely to involve some intentionality on the 
part of the deictic user.  Many vivid (eidetic) memories, although cued by events or 
qualities of events, are not deliberately accessed; but the subject’s response to the 
phantasma is likely to be deliberate, unless it is repeatedly associated with a par-
ticular memory.  Th ese retrospective memories in the form of deictically directed 
phantasmas can be planned, especially when the purpose is a social one – to pro-
vide directional information to a speech partner.  Bühler alludes to the use of deixis 
am phantasma in its social-orientational function when he refers to the “wanderer”. 
To provide useful instructions for orientation in a location other than the “here”, 
the speaker ordinarily imagines the self in the projected location via memories of 
previous experiences therein, obviating the need for planning to situate the other. 
Th e speaker must draw upon memories of his or her location to features within the 
projected physical environment, which requires orientation of the self incongruent 
with the current one.  Perhaps it is this incongruence which triggers the use of deic-
tics to reify the accuracy of the instructions for the self and/or the “wanderer”. Th is 
use of deixis am phantasma may be a precursor to graphic representations of the 
projected space, and may serve as a scaff old to constructing more adequate spatial 
instructions (Galantucci 2009). 
Deixis am phantasma is likewise employed to refer to events that have never ma-
terialized. Bühler poignantly illustrates the incorporation of prospective forms of 
deixis am phantasma: “Th e situation changes abruptly, however, it appears, where 
the narrator takes the listener into the realm of the memorable absent, or fully into 
the realm of constructive imagination […] this orientation [between ‘conversa-
tion partners’] in toto intervenes and is transposed into the ‘imagination space’, to 
the somewhere-realm of pure imagination and of the there-and-there in memory” 
(Bühler 1982[1934]: 22–23). Th ese prospective mental events which are con-
structed by the subject for the listener (perhaps in some cases from adaptations 
of directly or indirectly observed events) form the basis upon which phantasmas 
become more developed. With prospective mental representations, subjects can 
alter actual events in conventional or unconventional and dynamic ways, and can 
imagine events in places which they have never experienced through observation 
7  Imagined experiences, especially those which supersede a more subjective reality can (per-
haps more than observed ones) drive the cognitive and linguistic system to incorporate increas-
ingly diverse points of view (Harris 2000: 186–187), necessary to expansions in deictic use.  
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or participation. For such imaginings, phantasmas are not as reliant on actual expe-
rience and notice of a stimulus in the physical context; and subjects can construct 
new roles for themselves and others in events which may never be actualized.
Bühler likens the use of deixis am phanstasma (from speaker to listener) to de-
vices used in fi ctional contexts by actors, especially when engaging in monologues, 
“the speaker and hearer of a visual description of something absent possess the 
same talent and resources that permit the actor on stage to make something that is 
absent present and which permit the audience to interpret what is on the stage as a 
mimesis of something absent” (Bühler 1990[1934]: 142). Th e fi ctional, onstage, 
account (oft en monologic) and the imaginative account, rooted in real-time con-
versational exchange make use of deictics not merely for the audience, or speech 
partner, but to directionalize the self and emphasize the orientation of the speaker. 
In other words, directional gestures and directional terms which are devices inher-
ent to demonstratio ad oculos resurface and extend their function, from consolidat-
ing or making contiguous present objects in their physical or spatial context, to es-
tablishing contiguity (temporal and topic relevance) between the location of the 
speaker, and the absent object or event under consideration. Th e deictic in the lat-
ter case serves to unite the absent or imaginative, as if it were vividly present – an 
invisible something which, because of its invisibility, calls up the necessity to re-
place the invisible with a mental image of the intended referent. Th e spectators, in 
the context of performed fi ction, can mentally image the invisible something indi-
cated by the deictic, without sharing their constructed imagination with the actor – 
the soliloquy of the actor does not require an interpretation or sharing thereof. 
Conversely, conversational maxims invite the listener, as a speech partner, to pro-
vide a response to validate shared focus. Hence, the spectator can be more passive 
in revealing the constructed image which emerges from the deictic use, and may 
feel greater liberty to be creative in such constructions, while the conversational 
partner is expected to take an active role in topic maintenance. Although the anal-
ogy which Bühler proposes between spectator and speech partner demonstrates 
the pivotal function of deictics to refer to absent or imagined entities, it minimizes 
the more principal function of these deictics in connecting actual events to con-
structed ones. While actors on stage use deictic devices to connect a present fi c-
tional event with an absent fi ctional event, a speaker in real space and time employs 
these devices to make contiguous the real with the imaginative unreal.
Deixis am phantasma that refers to a mental representation can be activated 
from memories of diverse types: static past experiences of events in which the 
originator has participated, static events which the originator has merely observed, 
dynamic events with some features of either of the foregoing, and dynamic events 
which are wholly constructed. Th e latt er two types constitute sources for pro-
spective memories; and those memories that surface in real time may emanate 
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from some form of dream, be it daydreams, fantasy, or remnants of REM sleep. 
References to these sources are replete in Bühler’s discussion of deixis am phan-
tasma:  “Let him consider, for example, the diff erence between being awake with 
one’s senses about one and the familiar form of transport (Entrücktsein) in dreams” 
(Bühler 1990[1934]: 143).
Bühler’s schema of deixis am phantasma includes these retrospective and pro-
spective elements, without explicit mention of any ontogenetic sequence. In 
Bühler’s own words, deictic reference proceeds “from less-diff erentiated to richer 
inventories of form” (Bühler 1982[1934]: 17). Th is “richness” derives from the 
source of the representation, which in turn infl uences the nature of the deictic form 
or kind of representation that the subject chooses to employ. In the case of retro-
spective phantasma (“situation-phantasma”), the subject chooses more iconically-
based, somewhat static forms which refl ect some semblance of replica, oft en in the 
form of images of past events. Th e subject moves to more dynamic “inventories of 
form” with phantasmas fl owing from constructed events which are eventually dis-
placed from familiar locations.  (Current fi ndings from studies in “working memo-
ry” (WM) validate that the developmental progression is from the coordination of 
static images to the coordination of dynamic, novel ones (Baddeley 2007: 148).)8 
Th e retrospectively-based phantasmas, since they include a dynamic, constructed 
essence, are driven by idiosyncratic aff ect, which results in substantive changes in 
created cognitions, namely, novel origos, novel orientations to objects, and novel 
places for these events to be carried out.  Th us, the “glue” which mediates sign and 
object experiences a transcendence from static, conventional meanings, to dynam-
ic, intrapsychological ones, which, although they may be constructed from conven-
tional meanings issuing from the index-object relation, have incorporated novel 
intuitions of origos, places, and objects. Th ese meanings or eff ects, which consist 
of novel intuitions, are driven by preferences and emotions, and culminate in emo-
tional intelligence.
8  In Baddeley’s explanation and description of the function of the “episodic buff er” in WM, 
he identifi es two types of binding, whereby information is coordinated: static and dynamic. 
While static binding coordinates co-occurring features of events which are frequent or ordinary, 
dynamic binding integrates co-occurring features of novel information. Baddeley determines 
that dynamic binding in WM, as orchestrated by the episodic buff er which assists in integrating 
features of long and short term memory, requires higher computational demands, since 
formatt ing novel features within an integrated episode necessitates distinctive memory formats. 
Presumably, more mature cognitive systems are more adept at handling the integration of novel 
episodic features as opposed to the more automatic encoding and organization of features which 
typically appear together in episodes. Th e former relies on more conscious WM skills, taking up 
greater cognitive resources.
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4. Application of Peircean sign-theory 
to Bühler’s deictic framework
Th e developmental nature of Bühler’s framework brings greater structure to 
Peirce’s earlier claims regarding the coexistence of index with its object, to his later 
observations of the semiosis of signs in general, and indexical signs in particular. 
Bühler’s conception of indexical reference from the physical, to the social, to the 
imaginative demonstrates a layering of the initial import of Secondness in direct 
experience to its inclusion as a single component with Firstness and Th irdness in 
social interaction, to the decreased import of Secondness in imaginative and intra-
psychological operations. Th is departure from Secondness (as physically instan-
tiated) allows for expansion of Peirce’s Dynamic Object as well as the Dynamic 
Interpretant. Indexical signs are particularly illustrative of semiosis, in that their 
beginnings demonstrate the starkest instantiations of Secondness, when compared 
with the Icon or Symbol.
Given the triadic relationship within the sign, the object has the greatest real-
ization in Secondness; and when the object is Immediate, it necessarily stands in 
direct spatial and temporal contiguity with the sign. Nonetheless, if the object is of 
the Dynamic kind, some spatial and temporal att enuation may hold. Th e att enu-
ation (either spatially, temporally, or both) exists consequent to some Th irdness-
based agent, which binds the Dynamic Object to its sign apart from directional fea-
tures. Th e Th irdness component oft en does not rise to the level of a conventionally 
recognized legisign/proposition, but emerges from subjective, idiosyncratic obser-
vations or expectations of how similar objects can constitute those of the same in-
dexical sign. Th e original place where an object is ordinarily found becomes part 
of the Immediate Object, but given a displacement between the Immediate Object 
and its original context, the object’s absence pervades and defi nes that space; and 
has such an eff ect on the index as to call it forth. Such is a quintessential example of 
how Dynamic Objects “aff ect the sign”.  
For Bühler, demonstratio ad oculos refers to adherence of spatial and temporal 
contiguity in the referential act, such that index is necessarily concurrent with its 
object. Th is early use can be associated with Peirce’s notion that index can be used 
without an interpretant, that is, without a discernable meaning, and early non-con-
trastive demonstrative or locative use. Pre-linguistic pointing and early linguistic 
uses of the distal demonstrative “that” constitute indexes without any easily codifi -
able meaning. Given the lack of perceptual and functional similarities among ob-
jects of “that”, making the meaning of the indexical sign vague in this use – “that” 
referring to any object of Ego’s focus, regardless of its relative location – the neces-
sity of the interpretant is questionable, particularly when the Immediate Object 
is co-present with the sign. “Th at” used in a novel context for any novel object 
 Cognitive and linguistic underpinnings of deixis am phantasma 33
constitutes an indexical sign which is subjectively employed to refer to any object 
of speaker’s choice – the type and number of objects is infi nite, and the speaker’s 
association of “that” to refer to one of a host of objects which do not share similar 
att ributes is not guided by convention.  
Were this Immediate Object physically removed from the spatio-temporal con-
text, “that” would not serve as a sign; but “that” remains a sign despite the absence 
of codifi able meaning. “An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character 
which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that character if 
there were no interpretant” (1902: B104; CP 2.304). In this early use, which Peirce 
classifi es as “degenerate”9 (demonstratio ad oculos), the pointing fi nger or distal de-
monstrative would lose its character as referring to a particular object in the absence 
of that object, provided that mental representations of that object are not a part of 
the referring act.10 Th is initial use validates Peirce’s adherence to spatial and tempo-
ral contiguity between sign and object, while allowing for semiosis to continue in 
ontogeny, when physical contiguity is less intrinsic to the indexical sign-object rela-
tion as a consequence of social and intrapsychologically based interpretants. 
Bühler’s anaphoric/social-situational deixis is an appropriate characteriza-
tion for the advance to the use of index in joint att entional schemes, and to index’s 
codifi cation of speaker-addressee role-taking and consequent reciprocal orienta-
tional relations with proximal and distal objects. Bühler’s emphasis on social-situ-
ational deictic use underscores the increased role of Th irdness to social experienc-
es in Secondness – in codifying near, as opposed to far, objects from a particular 
origo’s perspective (ordinarily that of a conversational participant); the import of 
Th irdness is evident. Th irdness here materializes as a class of perspectives which re-
lies on social roles. Th e indexical nature of these social roles is obviated in their in-
herent reciprocal nature – shift ing from speaker to addressee, and the reverse. Th is 
social-situational use demonstrates the onset of Peirce’s genuine11 index, in that the 
demonstrative becomes an indexical legisign at the point in development when 
9  “A Degenerate Index is a representamen which represents a single object because it is factually 
connected with it, but which conveys no information whatever” (EP 2:172, italics Peirce’s).
10  “Degenerate uses are not less indexical than are genuine ones; they merely consist in the most 
central, or most nuclear, of what characterizes indexicality, namely, Secondness, coexistence be-
tween sign and object.  Degenerate indexical use actually represents the core of what it means to 
engage in an indicative act, stripped of the typical perceptions, interpretations, and conventions 
which later att ach thereto, as a consequence of experience and culturally-ascribed determinations. 
Th e “purest” use of index, then, is the degenerate form, which, rather than implying inferior status, 
or a departure from the norm, represents the zero-point of indexical use” (West 2012: 303).
11  “Th e Genuine Index represents the duality between the representamen and its object. 
As a whole it stands for the object; but a part or element of it represents [it] as being the 
Representamen, by being an Icon or analogue of the object in some way; and by virtue of that 
duality, it conveys information about the object”  (EP 2:171, italics Peirce’s).
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contrastive demonstratives are productive, at approximately 3;0 (West 2010: 12; 
West 2011a: 671). Because contrastive uses of demonstratives represent a general 
type (“this”: speaker as origo to proximate object; “that”: speaker as origo to distal 
object) and because of their continued designative function, Th irdness is inscribed 
upon Secondness (experience).12 For Bühler, situational deixis includes origos and 
objects which are subject to reciprocal perspectives to one another, i.e., speaker can 
face addressee and have a distinctive perspective, but speaker can likewise take ad-
dressee’s conversational role and have an identical or distinctive perspective from 
the original speaker in the event that orientations to objects are altered; nonethe-
less, those situations materialize in the here and now. In situational deixis, then, 
there still exists an adherence to spatial and temporal contiguity between the sign 
and object which is consonant with Peirce’s core att ributes of index, in that index 
implies the presence of factual information, reference to an individual(s), and the 
absence of resemblance or law-likeness.13 Th e nature of indexical interpretants is 
still socially motivated, such that speaker and addressee exist in a dynamic conver-
sational relationship, and when they narrate their role in an event spoken about, 
their orientations to physical objects can change concurrent with orientational 
alterations to objects within the spatial milieu. Nevertheless, the change is physi-
cal, not mental. It requires a movement in orientation of the origo to the objects, 
or of the objects to an origo that is stationary. Despite the potential alteration of 
objects or of origo in this social-situational deictic use, the alteration is not primar-
ily mental or intrapsychological. In fact, the transition to envisioning other origos 
in novel places, etc., involves iconic projection, that is, seeing Self in a place other 
than “here-space”.
Bühler’s concept of deixis am phantasma assumes that while temporal contigu-
ity between indexical sign and object is maintained, spatial contiguity can be for-
feited, and the deictic use can still refer. In other words, a pointing fi nger to refer to 
an absent object appears to violate a core feature of Peirce’s index, yet if the object 
is a mental image or memory of the physical object to which the pointing gesture 
is att ributed as a sign, the two are temporally contiguous, saving index from an-
nihilation as a sign. Th e social nature of indexical interpretants for absent objects 
is the catalyst for the use of index without spatial contiguity with its object. Th e 
att empt on the part of the message-producer to direct the addressee to a shared 
mental construct of the object illustrates the mechanism by which social inter-
pretants motivate the semiosis of index. Children point or gaze toward a location 
where the physical object might be expected while maintaining joint att ention with 
12  Since this line of argumentation is not exhaustive to the inclusion of Firstness in the 
paradigm, its purpose is not to exclude the import of Firstness.
13  Cf. Atkin’s (2005: 163–170) and West’s (2012) discussion of Peirce’s indexical att ributes.
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(sporadically looking toward) another (Saylor 2004: 608–609).14 Th is scenario 
oft en includes the use of non-contrastive demonstratives. Th is characterization is 
a consequence of increased use of mental images as signs in the Piagetian sense,15 
and as a consequence of Bühler’s claim that fantasy injects itself into reality, par-
ticularly during childhood. Th is imaginative function triggers further semiosis, but 
with intrapsychological eff ects, akin to developing an inner dialogue. Th e social is 
still the impetus for idiosyncratic imaginings, especially when indexical signs (di-
rectional gestures, demonstratives) function to call up a similar mental image or 
memory involving a physically absent object in the mind of another, which oft en 
is based on shared experience. In fact, the use of index to refer to absent objects 
would have litt le purpose without joint att entional schemes. 
Peirce’s interpretants, in the case of absent objects, represent the very essence of 
social interchange, since matching meaning to the intended object (covert image) 
via an indexical sign characterizes their resultative function. Th e assumption here 
is that Peirce not merely allows for, but considers, objects to be mental (CP 8.368 
fn23). To aff ect the Self intrapsychologically, as in covert dialogue, indexical signs 
must consist of mental images of a visual or auditory index. Reference to absent 
objects refl ects an extension of the indexical interpretant from the objects and ori-
entations which are merely perceptual, though expressing distinct speaker orienta-
tions or distinct addressee orientations, to a replica of experiences which had been, 
or a modifi cation of those experiences, or to a novel construction of events never 
experienced. Th e two former realizations of indexical interpretant emanate from 
the act of deixis am phantasma, since matching the speaker’s memory of the object 
to that of message-receiver is paramount, relying heavily on shared, hence past, 
experiences: “If someone wants to show something to someone else, then both of 
them, the one who is doing the leading and the one who is being led, must have a 
suffi  cient degree of harmonious orientation; orientation within an order schema in 
which the reference object has its place” (Bühler 1982[1934]: 22). Indexical inter-
pretants whose objects are mental constructs demonstrate a heightened degree of 
aff ect (Firstness). Th e eidetic memories which compel the use of indexical signs in 
14  Saylor (2004: 602–603), and Saylor and Ganea (2007: 698) claim that infants recognize 
absent objects upon sustained gaze toward a physical att ribute (colour/shape) of an object aft er 
its removal from a child’s environment; these mental representations can be held in memory for 
more than two minutes (Ganea, Saylor 2007).
15  According to Piaget and Inhelder (1969[1966]: 55), children’s means to mentally represent 
becomes apparent just prior to the emergence of language and “deferred imitation” is the 
primary indicator of the emergence of mental imagery aft er which other, more creative mental 
representations can be developed.  Deferred imitation entails reenacting a prior experience 
which the child observed or took part in at a later time – the memory sustains the reenactment. 
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a deixis am phantasma context are dynamic objects16 in that they “aff ect the sign”, 
rather than the sign aff ecting them; and their interpretants, if meaning precedes 
form in development, serve as catalysts to this novel use of indexical signs – index 
lacking contiguity with object.17 Th e aff ect which calls up the eidetic memory in 
Firstness gives rise to expanded interpretants for the use of indexical signs, still 
dependent on social exchange (matching speaker’s eidetic image to one which ad-
dressee recalls) while permitt ing a degenerate index to depart from its earlier spa-
tial contiguity with its object. Th e eff ect of the dynamic object on the deictic sign 
also transforms the function of the sign from social to intrapsychological, since ei-
detic memories can likewise produce alterations within the mind of the Self, where 
the dynamic object originates. Eidetic memories as dynamic objects become in-
creasingly networked with other eidetic memories so as to alter the contributing 
images to form a constructed one – a novel dynamic object.  
Th e dynamic object aff ects the deictic sign, modifying its character from con-
tiguous, to simultaneous space and time directional instrument, to one which may 
not adhere to concurrent actualization in space and time. Th e very nature of the 
indexical sign experiences a shift  to increasingly less dependence on perceptually 
apparent objects; and index itself may undergo a revolution from overtly present 
to covert representations of graphic arrays displaced from Self as origo, and Self as 
“here and now”. It is precisely the potentiality present in the indexical sign, and in 
its Immediate Object (more so than in iconic or symbolic sign), which supplies the 
opportunity for such momentous degrees of semiosis.  Th e fact that the degenerate 
Index, without its object, “asserts nothing” (CP 3.361), permits its object to infl u-
ence its use. Index’s objects need not subscribe to conventions, as is the case for 
symbols; they can emerge within an individual with “brute force”, and can sudden-
ly and capriciously draw att ention to a fl eeting thought. Th e Index, in these cases, 
might consist in seeming inatt ention to contemporaneous events consequent to an 
inner focus on intrapsychologically constructed cognitions, e.g., envisioning self 
or others in places or times where they are not. With the signifi cant interplay that 
holds between Index and its Immediate or Dynamic Object, surfaces a shift  in the 
quality of its interpretant. Meanings and eff ects of deictic arrays (orientation(s) 
16  “…We have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself 
represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent on the Representation of it in the Sign, from 
the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the 
Sign to its Representation” (CP 4.536).
17  In fact, Peirce distinguishes the indexical sign as the most likely of the signs (iconic, 
indexical, symbolic) to be associated with the dynamic object, which is especially so later 
in development: the “reference of a sign to its object is brought into special prominence” 
(MS 7, 000016).
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between origos and their environments) are no longer confi ned to physical space, 
nor to what is possible in the physical world, but can encompass orientations not 
ordinarily possible, and origos with status not typically accorded, e.g., an observer 
of a carousel in a non-gravitational sett ing. Th e semiosis of deictic signs can de-
velop exponentially, given the force and degree of eff ect which governs between 
the index as a particular sign based in Secondness, and its object, which oft en de-
fi nes it. Even the character of Secondness can transcend the physical to imagined 
existence.
When message-producers dispense with pointing and similar gestural indices to 
refer to non-present objects or events, deixis am phantasma  acquires more abstract 
means of indexing, requiring the message-producer to assume an orientation in a 
place diff erent from the speaker’s actual spatio-temporal location. Bühler proposes 
that the message-producer can take the perspective of either of two origos: that of 
the self, or that of another, “imaginary wanderer”. When describing to another how 
to orient in a spatio-temporal context other than the actual, the speaker must either 
envision self in that place, or must shift  the point of orientation to a known or un-
known traveller, who might have reason to visit such a place. Bühler (1990[1934]: 
146–147) illustrates this shift  as follows: “[M]ovement of the origo [...] [is] a fun-
damental shift [...] brought about by the transition from the visual fi eld of the mon-
ocular being to the unifi ed visual fi eld of a binocular being... Briefl y, the perceptual 
here is not always at the same position in the tactile body image[...] Only if one has 
fi rst properly considered these [properties] will one be able intuitively to under-
stand the seemingly random variety of deictic words and deictic procedures.” Th e 
message-producer must not merely cognitively shift  orientation within another 
imagined place, but in assuming a distinctive origo, must envision the imagined 
place, together with orientation within such, from the perspective of another. Such 
goes beyond injecting self into novel contexts and all the potential spatial relations 
incumbent thereto; instructing another in an absent place requires objectifi ca-
tion – seeing with the perceptions of another. 
Th is latt er cognitive advance presumes that speaker can anticipate the prefer-
ences and aff ect of another in the imagined space and time. Such preferences may 
include notice of diff erent objects, or aspects of objects, and tendencies toward 
particular canonical or non-canonical orientations to objects. As a consequence 
of greater objectifi cation, the semiosis of index and its interpretants draws further 
upon Firstness and Th irdness, but with fewer idiosyncratic limitations to what self 
feels, thinks, and desires. Th e means to assume the point of view of another with-
in imagined contexts entails the element of Firstness in anticipating a preference 
or notice disparate from the speaker’s own. Such can include any fears, likes, dis-
likes, and interpretations consequent to individualized perceptions, which Peirce 
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categorizes as “dynamic interpretants”.18  Although these emotions are idiosyncrat-
ic, they are not subjectively so, and constitute Firstness precisely because they are 
primarily derivatives of aff ect. Th is means to shift  origo to that of “the imaginary 
wanderer” likewise illustrates an amplifi ed use of Th irdness, since the eff ects of an-
other’s potential experience culminate in concepts, propositions, or habits which 
in turn can be integrated into the conceptual repertoire of the individual creating 
the orientational instructions. Constructed mental images (not reliant on egocen-
tric information) of another origo within imagined contexts can become part of 
the speaker’s own intrapsychological experience. Th is increased perspective-taking 
competence results in continued fomentation of objectifi cation and illustrates how 
Th irdness contributes to the semiosis of deictic signs. Th e Peircean concept of the 
evolving interpretant elevates the use of index from a visual tool motivated by so-
cial forces to an internal covert tool whose purpose is intrapsychological change 
and control. Th e imagined place, independent of whether it exists or has been 
observed, does not represent Secondness proper, given that it is not in existential 
relationship with the speaker-experiencer and, in fact, may not represent a past 
experience in whole or in part. Instead, the imagined place represents extended 
Secondnesses whose interpretants are of the “fi nal” sort. Th irdness and Firstness 
characterize the interpretant of indices involving shift ing origos (as obviated in de-
ictic use), since possible places, orientations, and perspectives are subjectively con-
structed (Firstness), and since novel patt erns of behaviour and novel limits of be-
haviour are being established from taking another’s perspective (Th irdness).
5. Conclusion
Recognition of the existence of a host of legitimate perspectives as a consequence 
not merely of observance of diff erent spatial orientations between points of ref-
erence and objects, but of the creation of new perspectives in unobserved places 
through fantasy and imagination constitutes a precursor for appreciation of diff er-
ent cultural and cognitive identities. Short of Peirce’s categorization of the deictic 
as a sign subject to evolving interpretants from within the sign-object relationship, 
Bühler’s deictic framework is truncated.  
Bühler’s deixis am phantasma, which underscores the human mechanisms 
by which imagination deixis can materialize, is instructive in determining how 
18  “In all cases [the Dynamic Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense 
of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke 
some kind of eff ort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely 
called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the “energetic”, and the 
“logical” interpretants” (EP 2:409). 
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indexical reference in the absence of the signifi ed is triggered; but falls short of es-
tablishing the extent of the deictic continuum into constructed realities as distinct 
from static remembered ones. It is Peirce’s contribution of the dynamic object to 
indexical sign defi nition, coupled with his insistence that the interpretant is so inte-
gral to the sign (heightening the semiosis of deictic expressions), that accounts for 
the ongoing process of deictic meaning.
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Познавательные и лингвистические подкрепления 
deixis am phantasma: семиотика Бюлера и Пирса
В статье рассматриваются три вида дейксиса по Бюлеру, при этом особое внимание со-
средоточено на  deixis am phantasma (дейксис, указывающий на отсутствующий рефе-
рент).  Такое употребление дейксиса напрямую связано с семиозисом индекса, учитывая 
центрированность объекта и интерпретанты в изменении функции индексального знака 
в онтогенезе. Употребление дейктических знаков для обозначения отсутствующих объек-
тов (некоторые из которых являются ментальными) как бы катализирует переход от более 
социального, конвенционального их использования к более внутреннему, образному.  Ис-
пользованная Бюлером аналогия ментальных объектов с «мимезисом» служит источни-
ком для для утверждения, что статические и более динамические воспоминания, питаемые 
аффектом,  приводят дейксис к указанию на более динамические объекты и более дина-
мические интерпретанты, к более конструированным реалиям. Два типа объектов и три 
типа интерпретант  у Пирса окончательно оформляют дейктическую структуру Бюлера; 
они определяют успехи в дейктическом семиозисе, которые остались недоработанными 
у Бюлера, и объясняют, каким образом дейктическое использование расширяет семиозис 
индекса.
Deixis am phantasma kognitiivsed ja lingvistilised tugipunktid: 
Bühleri ja Peirce’i semiootika
Käsitluses vaadeldakse Bühleri kolme liiki deiksist, keskendudes neist kõige keerukamale kasu-
tusele – deixis am phantasma (deiktikud, mis osutavad puuduvatele referentidele). See kasutus-
viis on indeksisemioosi suhtes otsustava tähtsusega, kui võtt a eelduseks objekti ja interpretandi 
keskne tähtsus indeksiaalse märgi funktsiooni muutumisel ontogeneesis. Deiktiliste märkide 
rakendamine, viitamaks puuduvatele objektidele (millest mõned on mentaalsed), moodustab 
katalüsaatori üleminekul sotsiaalsematelt, konventsionaalsematelt kasutusvõimalustelt sees-
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mistele, kujutlusvõimest lähtuvatele. Mentaalsete objektide analoogia “mimeesiga”, mida 
kasutas Bühler, annab alust väiteks, et staatilisemad ja dünaamilisemad mälestused, mida toida-
vad afektid, panevad deiktikuid osutama dünaamilisematele objektidele ja dünaamilisematele 
interpretantidele, konstureeritumatele reaalidele. Peirce’i kaht tüüpi objektid ning kolme tüü-
pi interpretandid täiendavad Bühleri deiktilist raamistust, need määratlevad arenguid deiktili-
ses semioosis, mida Bühler ise välja ei arenda, ning pakuvad välja põhimõtt e selle kohta, kuidas 
deiktikute kasutus avardab indeksisemioosi.
